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The “Green Patent Paradox” and Fair Use: 
The Intellectual Property Solution to Fight Climate 
Change 
Samuel E. Cayton * 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Climate Crisis 
It cannot be doubted that climate change is one of the greatest 
threats to the world and is in part anthropogenic (affected by humans).1 
The scientific consensus on climate change is clear: the rise of industry 
has contributed to a rise in greenhouse gases (GHGs) that enter Earth’s 
atmosphere, including carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous 
oxide (N20).2 The persistent increase of GHGs in the atmosphere raises the 
global temperature, which in turn creates or accelerates other environmen-
tal impacts.3 The recent forest fires in the Amazon rainforest, Australia, 
and the United States (U.S.), for example, are attributed to higher temper-
atures.4 These higher temperatures increase evaporation, leading to de-
creased moisture in vegetation which allows fires to spark more frequently 
 
* Samuel Cayton is a third-year student at Seattle University School of Law who graduates with his 
Juris Doctor in May 2021. He would like to thank his partner, family, and friends for their continued 
support over the years; the hardworking SJTEIL community for the hours and diligent efforts they 
put into reviewing this work; and his law school professors–namely, Professors Steven Tapia, Mar-
garet Chon, and Deirdre Bowen–who have had a lasting impact on his ambitions and passions within 
the law. This article would not be possible without any one of them. 
1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], FIFTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2013), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2017/09/WG1AR5_Chapter01_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UGE2-DSMF]. 
2 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], SPECIAL REPORT: 
GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C (2019), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/up-
loads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_Low_Res.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZF4-SHF5] [hereinafter 
“IPCC SPECIAL REPORT”]. 
3 Id. 
4 Daisy Dunne, Explainer: How Climate Change is Affecting Wildfires Around the World, 
CARBONBRIEF (July 14, 2020), https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-how-climate-change-is-af-
fecting-wildfires-around-the-world [https://perma.cc/2Z42-VH9E]. 
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and spread more rapidly.5 Also, melting polar ice caps will further raise 
global sea levels, contributing to increased flooding, salinity in coastal 
groundwater, and damage to infrastructure.6 Additionally, because Earth’s 
oceans absorb 30% of anthropogenic CO2, ocean warming, ocean acidifi-
cation, and changes in the carbonate compositions continue to occur.7  
These changes in ocean environments negatively impact marine organisms 
and ecosystems, as well as the aquaculture and fishery industries that rely 
on them.8  
Undeniably, the effects of climate change disparately impact the 
Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) community. For exam-
ple, neighborhoods with higher populations of BIPOC individuals, within 
the metropolitan areas of Detroit, Michigan; Memphis, Tennessee; Chi-
cago, Illinois; and Kansas City, Missouri, are frequently targeted loca-
tions.9 Likewise, the increasing severity of hurricanes and rising sea levels 
poses disproportionately higher risks to BIPOC communities in the Baha-
mas; Kivalina, Alaska; and other areas.10 With fewer opportunities for ad-
vancement as a result of systemic racism and injustice, these communities 
lack the opportunity to leave these regions.11 Evidently, racial justice can-
not be achieved without climate justice. 
A recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) laid out the prospective effects of 1.5°C and 2°C increases 
in average global temperatures above the preindustrial average, and what 
is required by global leaders to mitigate those effects.12 Two years ago, the 
United Nations warned that the world has twelve years to ensure global 
temperatures do not exceed 1.5°C, or else the effects from climate change 
will “significantly worsen.”13 Thus, the current assessment is now ten 
years. Recognizing that climate change is an existential threat to humanity, 
the United Nations convened in 2015 for the historical Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), better known as the Paris Climate 
 
5 Id. 
6 IPCC SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 2. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People, Environmental and Climate Justice, NAT’L 
ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, https://www.naacp.org/issues/environmental-
justice/ [https://perma.cc/3VZD-5W66] [hereinafter “NAACP”]. 
10 NAACP, supra note 9; Adelle Thomas & Rueanna Haynes, Black Lives Matter: The Link Between 
Climate Change and Racial Justice, CLIMATE ANALYTICS (June 22, 2020), https://climateanalyt-
ics.org/blog/2020/black-lives-matter-the-link-between-climate-change-and-racial-justice/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z24H-8H4V]. 
11 Thomas & Haynes, supra note 10.  
12 IPCC SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 2. 
13 Jonathan Watts, We have 12 years to limit climate change catastrophe, warns UN, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 8, 2018, 7:23 AM) https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/08/global-warming-
must-not-exceed-15c-warns-landmark-un-report [https://perma.cc/F8WP-MUHT]. 
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Agreement.14 Countries signing onto the agreement pledged to fundamen-
tally transform their economies and energy systems by the year 2030.15 
Although the U.S. helped lead this effort to combat climate change, Pres-
ident Donald Trump announced on June 1, 2017, that the U.S. would be 
withdrawing from the agreement.16 Although the President had served no-
tice to quit the Paris Climate Agreement on November 4, 2019, the U.S. 
remains part of the UNFCCC today because actual withdrawal cannot oc-
cur until 2021.17 Fortunately, the election of former Vice President Joseph 
R. Biden signals a reversal of President Trump’s decision to leave 
UNFCCC and makes the Agreement’s “goal of limiting global warming 
to 1.5°C ‘within striking distance[.]’”18 Regardless, climate change–or ra-
ther, the climate crisis–still poses a major threat to humanity.19 
B. A New Patent Regime 
Regardless of the current state of U.S. politics, pledges and actions 
from the federal government are not enough to combat the climate crisis.20 
Although U.S. industry has substantially contributed to the effects of cli-
mate change, it can remedy such effects.21  In particular, the U.S. needs to 
initiate structural change in innovation that should originate in creating 
progressive changes to its patent regime. As innovations in green technol-
ogy catch up to the climate crisis, the U.S. will need to change patent law 
to allow for more expansions in green technology transfers to secondary 
users.22 While several recent proposed policy changes and commercial in-
itiatives have tried to effectively transform the patent regime in the wake 
of the climate crisis, they either lacked the urgency to address this crisis or 
had the collateral effect of stalling innovation.  
 
14 UNITED NATIONS, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2016), http://unfccc.int/re-
source/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf [https://perma.cc/KRP6-NB26] [hereinafter “UNFCCC”]. 
15 Id. 
16 Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-agreement-climate.html 
[https://perma.cc/3XEV-DFYU]. 
17 Id.  
18 Helen Regan, Joe Biden’s Climate Plan Could Put Paris Agreement Targets ‘Within Striking Dis-
tance,’ Experts Say, CNN (Nov. 9, 2020, 1:20 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/09/poli-
tics/biden-climate-plan-election-intl-hnk/index.html [https://perma.cc/S8PH-3BT5]. 
19 Although “climate change” and “climate crisis” can be used interchangeably, “climate crisis” more 
accurately invokes the phenomenon’s seriousness as a global health threat. Nick Sobczyk, How Cli-
mate Change Got the Label “Crisis”, E&E NEWS (July 10, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/sto-
ries/1060718493 [https://perma.cc/D4GZ-LUBJ]. 
20 Deborah Behles, The New Race: Speeding Up Climate Change Innovation, 11 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 
1, 2 (2009). 
21 Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection, 4 HARV. J. 
L. & TECH. 193, 193 (1991). 
22 Behles, supra note 20, at 33. For purposes of this article, a “secondary user” of a patent refers to a 
person or entity who infringes upon a patent by using, making, selling, or offering to sell that patent 
holder’s invention without permission. 
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Patent law, unlike copyright law and trademark law, does not have 
a fair use doctrine.23 While several arguments justify its exclusion, many 
others support the extension of fair use to patent law.24 Given that allevi-
ating the climate crisis requires a massive expansion of patented green 
technologies in the market, fair use as an affirmative defense to patent in-
fringement in this context would provide a strong framework within the 
patent regime to permit secondary use while still protecting patent holders’ 
rights. This article advocates for fair use’s extension into patent law as a 
solution to fight climate change through mass expansion of green technol-
ogy, similar to the fair use doctrine codified in copyright law.  Specifically, 
it details a green patent-specific proposal to show how fair use will cure 
market deficiencies while maintaining the incentives of the inventor, while 
removing the barriers needed to bring green technology to market in suf-
ficient supply. Although fair use in patent law can benefit many other 
fields of technology, this article primarily focuses on the necessity for fair 
use of green technology.  
Part II of this article provides commentary on the existence of a 
“Green Patent Paradox” and demonstrates that the current patent regime 
in the U.S. includes barriers to effectively combat climate change. In doing 
so, it provides examples of patent infringement actions in federal court and 
other types of green patent-related disputes. Part III describes various pro-
posals and ideas to modify the patent system regarding green technology 
from both the public and private sectors and explains how they are ill-
equipped to implement a comprehensive system to fight climate change 
while protecting patent holders’ rights. Part IV evaluates discussions re-
garding the fair use doctrine’s application to patent law while comparing 
it to its counterpart in copyright law. Finally, Part V proposes a fair use 
defense against patent infringement on green technologies while consider-
ing and then dispelling several anticipated contentions against its exten-
sion.  
II. PATENT INFRINGEMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE: IS THERE A 
“GREEN PATENT PARADOX?” 
For a prospective patent holder to obtain a patent for their inven-
tion, they must file an application with the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (USPTO) and demonstrate that their invention is a patentable 
subject matter which is novel, non-obvious, and useful.25 Once the USPTO 
 
23 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (codifying the fair use doctrine in copyright law); see also 15 U.S.C. § 
1115(d)(4) (permitting use of others’ trademarks when used descriptively and in good faith); see also 
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing nomi-
native fair use as a defense to trademark infringement). 
24 See generally Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2000). 
25 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03. 
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issues the patent to the applicant, that inventor has the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering to sell, and selling that patent regard-
ing what is prescribed.26 A patent holder possesses the  right for twenty 
years from the issuance of a patent, after which it becomes part of the pub-
lic domain.27 Patent law’s fundamental policy tradeoff is that while the 
inventor has the exclusive right of their invention, the contents of the in-
ventions are disclosed to the public.28 Moreover, the patent holder does not 
technically have a monopoly on the patented invention: changes in law can 
eliminate the validity of a patent, geographical restrictions can reduce the 
scope of the patent’s use, and other equitable doctrines of law may be ap-
plicable.29 
 The justification for a patent holder’s right to exclude rests on the 
principle that it promotes innovation by giving the inventor an incentive 
to use their invention and benefit the public.30 However, while patent law 
assumes patent holders will efficiently license their technologies to make 
the best use of its potential, this notion is not always true.31 Even with the 
U.S. antitrust system geared toward preventing an entity’s full market con-
trol over products, patent grants give the rightsholder the power to exclude 
others from unauthorized secondary use of that technology.32 Furthermore, 
the refusal to license is not a defense against patent infringement in a law-
suit.33   
 If this principle is carried out to its fullest extent, there could be a 
prohibitive effect on initiatives to combat climate change. Globally, com-
panies have filed numerous green patents at varying rates among specific 
subsectors.34  While trends show that green patent applications are declin-
 
26 Id. § 154. 
27 Id.; Michael Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 767 
(2002). 
28 Brenda Simon, Patent Cover-Up, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1299, 1318 (2011). 
29 Lorelei De Larena, What Copyright Law Teaches Patent Law about Fair Use and Why Universi-
ties Are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR. L. REV. 779, 780-81 (2005). 
30 Carrier, supra note 27, at 766-67. 
31 Id. at 769. 
32 Id. 
33 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (“No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement … shall be de-
nied relief or deemed guilty of misuse … by reason of … refus[ing] to license or use any rights to 
the patent”). 
34 For example, the world has seen fewer patent filings in solar, wind, and nuclear energy but has 
seen moderately steady filing rates for smart home and electric vehicle technologies. The U.S. has 
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ing in part because of delays in research and development (R&D) and in-
vestment,35 certain technologies such as renewable energy are becoming 
“more profitable” and “less reliant on government subsidies.”36 Moreover, 
although the U.S. remains dependent on oil and thus resistant to transform-
ing its energy system,37 these statistics demonstrate significant innovation 
within green technology. Although the U.S. is now very likely to rejoin 
the global efforts to combat climate change, the consensus remains that 
private sector innovation is needed to effectuate the challenges ahead.38 
 This tension between the rights of the patent holder and the need 
to use their green technology can be described as the Green Patent Para-
dox, whereby patented technologies geared toward mitigating the effects 
of climate change or substituting environmentally hazardous industries 
may not reach their full potential in part because patentees refrain from 
licensing their products. Whether a major crisis within the patent regime 
concerning green technology exists is still too early to determine.39 How-
ever, recent suits in federal court foreshadow the prospect of this issue 
developing in the years to come.  
A. Paice and GE: Green Technology in Federal Court 
With regard to patent reform specifically, progress has been made 
around the world to actively combat the effects of climate change.40 At the 
same time, many lawsuits have been filed and argued in federal court con-
cerning secondary and more expansive uses of patented green technology. 
A patent holder is entitled to relief when a secondary user “makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells” the patented invention regardless of whether the 
secondary user possesses41 
However, the degree to which patentees can gain relief was lim-
ited by the Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange whereby permanent 
 
35 Natalie Sauer, Cleantech Patent Applications Plummet, Sparking Fears for Innovation, CLIMATE 
HOME NEWS (July 16, 2019, 6:54 PM), https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/07/16/cleantech-
patent-applications-plummet-sparking-fears-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/9BDA-JHWA]. 
36 Global Green Energy Patent Filing Jump 43% compared to 2016, BIOENERGY INT’L, (Oct. 6, 
2018), https://bioenergyinternational.com/research-development/global-green-energy-patent-filings-
2017-jump-43-compared-to-2016 [https://perma.cc/K466-9UVL]. 
37 KILPATRICK TOWNSEND, supra note 34. 
38 See Jon P. Santamauro, Failure is Not an Option: Enhancing the Use of Intellectual Property 
Tools to Secure Wider and More Equitable Access to Climate Change Technologies, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ACCESSING, 
OBTAINING, AND PROTECTING, 84, 88-89 (Abbe E.L. Brown ed., 2013). 
39 See generally Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, The Puzzling Persistence of the Intellectual Property 
Right/Climate Change Relationship, in ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ACCESSING, OBTAINING, AND PROTECTING, 59, 70-72 (Abbe 
E.L. Brown ed., 2013). 
40 Eric L. Lane, Keeping the LEDs on and the Electric Motors Running: Clean Tech in Court after 
eBay, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶ 4 (2010). 
41 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
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injunctive relief in patent infringement suits must meet four basic require-
ments for an injunction.42 A heightened standard for plaintiffs means that 
secondary uses of patented technologies have a better chance of surviving 
infringement suits. For commentators as well as secondary users, this de-
cision is seen as a partial victory because the patent infringement gravi-
tated from the old standard which automatically gave injunctive relief to 
the plaintiff.43 Since eBay, many subsequent green patent infringement 
cases have come before federal courts, providing mixed signals for future 
developments of green technology.44 
 In 1992, Paice LLC, a startup company in the business of hybrid 
gas-electric vehicles, filed a patent for its developed hybrid technology.45 
Paice’s patent application covered the utilization of an electric motor in 
conjunction with the standard internal combustion engine (ICE) that sup-
plies additional power and transfers torque to the drive wheels of conven-
tional automobiles.46 In 1994, the USPTO granted Patent No. 5,343,970 
(“the ‘970 patent”) to Paice.47 One year later, Toyota started developing 
hybrid gas-electric vehicles in Japan and later launched the Prius in 1997, 
which was subsequently released to the U.S. in 2000.48 Paice founder, Dr. 
Alex Severinsky, met with representatives of Toyota USA to demonstrate 
Paice’s hybrid technology and offer a license agreement; however, Toyota 
refused because it had “no intention of developing [Paice’s] technology.”49 
At subsequent meetings between the parties, Toyota acknowledging 
Paice’s strong contributions but still refusing its offer to license the pa-
tent.50 Thereafter, Paice filed suit against Toyota in the Eastern District of 
Texas for infringement of the ‘970 patent.51 
 Pursuant to eBay, the District Court denied permanent injunctive 
relief for Paice; however, the Court went on to hold that Toyota infringed 
on the patent rights of Paice and awarded ongoing royalties of $25 per 
infringing hybrid Toyota vehicle to Paice.52 On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
Court affirmed the denial of the injunction but remanded on the issue of 
 
42 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (“A plaintiff must demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering a balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
43 Lane, supra note 40, ¶ 5. 
44 Id. ¶ 6. 
45 Id. ¶ 9. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. ¶ 11; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970 (filed Sept. 1, 1992).  
48 Lane, supra note 40, ¶ 11.  
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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royalties, holding that the District Court could not allow further use by 
Toyota without clarifying how to calculate the ongoing royalty.53 On re-
mand, after providing the parties an opportunity to settle on a rate them-
selves, the District Court raised the ongoing royalties to $98 per hybrid 
vehicle.54  
Paice demonstrates the sheer benefit that eBay has toward resolv-
ing the Green Patent Paradox. If Dr. Severinsky had his way, Toyota 
would not have been able to sell the Prius, Highlander, Lexus RH400h, or 
other hybrid models in the U.S.55 Given Toyota’s success and leadership 
in the fuel efficiency market, such a result could have imposed a severe 
impact on the climate.56 However, given Dr. Severinsky’s zealousness to 
hold dominion over the hybrid motor, this case also reveals the potential 
threat of a patent holder not fully utilizing their rights on the rights of val-
uable green patents.  
Infringement suits on green patents have also covered alternative 
energy. In 2002, General Electric (GE) obtained U.S. Patent No. 5,083,039 
(the ‘039 patent),57 which covered a “wind turbine mechanism operating 
at variable speed under different wind condition[s].”58 This advancement 
was beneficial because U.S. electric companies previously had to adjust 
wind turbines based on “a standard fixed frequency [of 60Hz].”59 A few 
years later, GE and Mitsubishi, a Japanese wind turbine manufacturer, en-
gaged in a patent dispute over the ‘039 patent. GE brought an infringement 
action against Mitsubishi.60 Mitsubishi countered by filing61  a complaint 
in the Western District of Arkansas, accusing GE of violating antitrust law 
by dominating the market of variable speed wind turbines.62 
These suits illustrate what is considered “the beginning of an arms 
race for IP in the clean energy industry.”63 While these companies are ad-
vocating for what they believe are their rights to use this technology, the 
 
53 Id. at 1316. 
54 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (E.D. Tex. 2009); Lane, supra note 
40, ¶ 9 n. 72. 
55 Lane, supra note 40, ¶ 82. 
56 Id. ¶ 7. 
57 HEE-EUN KIM, THE ROLE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM IN STIMULATING INNOVATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: INCLUDING ASPECTS OF LICENSING AND 
COMPETITION LAW 65-66 (Prof. Dr. Christoph Ann, LL.M et al. eds., 2010). The ‘039 patent was 
originally issued to a California-based company called Kenentech in 1992. Id. However, after filing 
bankruptcy in the wake of a patent infringement suit with Enron Wind, the patent ended up in the 
hands of GE. Id. 
58 Id.; U.S. Patent No. 5,083,039 (filed Feb. 1, 1991). 
59 KIM, supra note 57, at 66. 
60 Id.; Gen. Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Ltd., No. 3:10-CV-00276-F, 2013 BL 141580 
(N.D. Tex. May 28, 2013). 
61 Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 6:10-CV-00812-JA-KRS (M.D. Fla. Filed 
May 20, 2010). 
62 Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 720 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (W.D. Ark. 2010).  
63 KIM, supra note 57, at 67.  
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need to expand this technology in the pursuit of mitigating the effects of 
climate change is sidelined. The ‘039 patent is a quality patent that effec-
tively blocked use by other companies wishing to achieve an energy qual-
ity standard without proper licensing.64 If a patent of this nature gets into 
the hands of an entity that sits on their intellectual property rights,65 then 
the benefits of the green technologies covered will not be imputed on so-
ciety. 
While Paice and GE are two major lawsuits in the area of green 
technology, other forms of patent infringement actions have reached fed-
eral court involving a wide variety of green patents.66 For example, one 
technology that has gained success in the realm of alternative energy is 
energy-efficient lighting such as light-emitting diodes (LEDs). LEDs are 
an effective substitute for standard incandescent lightbulbs and are more 
environmentally friendly; producing more light per watt, emitting partic-
ular colors of light without utilizing other color filters, and radiating very 
little heat.67 Additionally, LEDs are eco-friendly substitutes for technolo-
gies such as traffic lights and cell phones.68 Given the potential widespread 
use of LEDs, patent infringement disputes are inevitable. In 2019 alone, 
Technical LED Intellectual Property and Lighting Science Group collec-
tively filed nineteen patent infringement lawsuits against other companies, 
alleging that certain products infringe on their LED patents.69 Addition-
ally, numerous infringement lawsuits have arisen in other green technol-
ogy sectors such as solar power, batteries, and even eco-friendly pet prod-
ucts.70  
B. The International Trade Commission (ITC) 
 Outside of federal court, green patent holders have sought extra-
judicial methods of asserting their rights. One of these outlets is the Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC), an independent federal agency that 
 
64 Id. 
65 See infra Part II.C. 
66 See generally Eric Lane, Clean Tech in Court: Green Patent Complaint Update, GREEN PATENT 
BLOG (May 31, 2019), http://www.greenpatentblog.com [https://perma.cc/4UL7-3YXF].   
67 Lane, supra note 40, ¶ 55. 
68 Id. at ¶¶ 54-55. 
69 E.g. Jury Trial Demanded, Lighting Sci. Grp. Corp. v. Acuity Brands, Inc., 1:19-CV-00805 (D. 
Del. May 1, 2019); Jury Trial Demanded, Lighting Sci. Grp. Corp. v. Lumileds Holdings B.V., 1:19-
CV-00809 (D. Del. May 1, 2019); Jury Trial Demanded, Tech. LED Intell. Prop., LLC v. Shenzhen 
Gosund Tech. Co., Ltd., 1:19-CV-320 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2019). For a more exhaustive list of law-
suits over LED patents, see generally Eric Lane, supra note 66. 
70 E.g. Demand for Jury Trial, Hanwha Q Cells & Advance Materials Corp. v. Longi Green Energy 
Tech. Co., 1:19-CV-00450-UNA, (D. Del. Mar. 3, 2019); Demand for Jury Trial, Battery Conserva-
tion Innovations, LLC v. InMotion Tech. LLC, 3:19-CV-00794-AJB-BGS (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2019); 
Jury Trial Demanded, The Green Pet Shop Enter., LLC v. Briggs Healthcare, 1:19-CV-00725 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 5, 2019); see generally Lane, supra note 66. 
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Congress created in 1916 to investigate issues in international trade.71 The 
ITC has the authority to conduct “quasi-judicial” proceedings involving 
accusations of intellectual property infringements against imported prod-
ucts that allegedly infringe upon U.S. patent holders’ rights.72 Unlike fed-
eral jurisdictions over patent infringement suits, the ITC is not bound by 
the injunction standard set forth in eBay; therefore, if patent holders fail to 
obtain remedies in federal court, they may use the ITC as an alternative 
forum.73 
 The parties in Paice and GE had both resorted to using the ITC in 
their respective procedural histories. After the Federal Circuit denied 
Paice’s request for a permanent injunction against Toyota’s use of the 
drive trains, Paice looked alternatively to the ITC in 2008 to stop Toyota.74 
Paice’s ITC complaint stated that Toyota had previously stipulated to the 
fact that the drive trains infringed on the ‘970 patent.75 During the ITC 
proceedings, Paice asserted that res judicata and collateral estoppel were 
inapplicable due to the ongoing infringement.76 Upon Paice’s motion for 
summary proceedings, the ITC investigative staff agreed that Toyota’s 
products were materially the same as Paice’s.77 Ultimately, Paice’s strat-
egy resulted in a settlement with Toyota accepting a license agreement.78 
On the other hand, one year before the parties in GE initiated federal suits, 
they attempted to resolve their ‘039 patent dispute before the ITC.79  
Another set of green patent infringement lawsuits comes from Co-
lumbia University Professor Emeritus Gertrude Neumark Rothschild’s 
LED patents. Professor Emeritus Rothschild owned two patents prescrib-
ing methods of making LEDs emit lights with shorter wavelengths such as 
blue and green lights.80 In particular, her patents evaded the issue of “dop-
ing” the bandgap semiconductor materials of the LEDs and made them 
more economically efficient.81 Starting in 2005, she initiated several patent 
infringement suits against LED manufacturers in the Southern District of 
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New York and in 2008 began litigating through the ITC against technol-
ogy giants such as Nokia, Samsung, Sony, Hitachi, and others.82 Professor 
Emeritus Rothschild succeeded in receiving licensing agreements from 
settlements with the accused infringers.83  
Evidently, the ITC is a useful alternative dispute resolution forum 
outside of the federal court system that can effectively pressure settlements 
in patent disputes. However, its legitimacy within the patent regime and 
separation from federal precedent make it easier for patent holders to pre-
clude other parties from developing crucial inventions, further threatening 
the expansion of green technology.  
C. Green Patent Trolls and Non-Practicing Patentees (NPPs) 
Apart from filing patent infringement suits or utilizing other dis-
pute resolution forums, patent holders can turn to extreme alternate 
measures to curb development in the green technology space. A non-prac-
ticing patentee (NPP)–more commonly referred to as a “patent troll”–is a 
patent holder that does not commercialize their patent through use and in-
stead relies on licensing to generate revenue, often with the threat of liti-
gation.84 For instance, even with the reduced threat of injunctions under 
the eBay standard, patent holders like Professor Emeritus Rothschild can 
still pressure other technology companies into either taking their licensing 
agreement or halting their innovations without any legal determination on 
whether that innovation infringes on the patent.85 Thus, NPPs with overly 
broad green patents can employ transactional methods to prevent subse-
quent green technological developments, further threatening the global cli-
mate. 
Perhaps the most infamous patent troll is Intellectual Ventures 
(IV), a limited liability company based in Bellevue, Washington, and 
founded by former Microsoft Chief Technology Officer Nathan Myhr-
vold.86 IV has a large patent portfolio covering numerous fields of tech-
nology, owning around 1,000 patents from in-house inventions but having 
acquired over 30,000 from other people.87  Initially, IV created shell com-
panies to shield its identity as a patent holder but has since become more 
 
82 Id. ¶¶ 58-59. 
83 Id. ¶ 60. 
84 Id. ¶ 1. 
85 Id. ¶ 60. 
86 Morgan Baskin & Jack Denton, ‘The Ultimate Patent Troll’, PACIFIC STANDARD, 
https://psmag.com/magazine/a-patent-boogieman-with-the-potential-to-obliterate-aspiring-startups 
[https://perma.cc/2ENV-KQQT] (Sept. 16, 2018). 
87 Id. 
2020] The “Green Patent Paradox” and Fair Use 225 
transparent by publishing a patent list on its website.88 IV has a particularly 
negative reputation in the technology industry as they have the potential 
to “obliterate startups.”89 In fact, it has been called “the most hated com-
pany in tech.”90 IV has, however, played an active role in supporting sus-
tainability and green technology related ventures. Among others, it has 
supported, spun off, and partnered with companies such as Coffee Flour, 
TerraPower, Raisio, and Irrigation and Water Technologies (IWT).91 
Within its own patent scheme, the company owns numerous patents in so-
lar energy, wind energy, and other fields.92 Additionally, IV has a history 
of filing overly broad patent applications in various fields, including wind 
energy.93  
Given IV’s history of scaring competitors with lawsuits and using 
other techniques to curb others’ technological development, it is clear the 
patent system supports individualized patent holder interest rather than 
specifically promoting innovations to better society. IV and other NPPs 
have the leverage to thwart others’ entrepreneurial efforts despite the lack 
of their patents’ use, which threatens innovation and makes global sustain-
ability particularly vulnerable. 
D. Summary of the Green Patent Paradox 
Because of the dominion that a patent holder has over the rights 
to their patented technologies, the threat of valuable green technology not 
reaching the market on a necessary scale remains imminent. While the 
eBay decision is a step in the right direction for developing innovations in 
green technology, a gap remains in federal law as it does not establish in-
centives for entrepreneurs to bring green technology to the market without 
the fear of infringement actions. Moreover, patent holders can resort to the 
ITC as another avenue for seeking a permanent injunction, posing an even 
greater threat to the global climate. Furthermore, patent holders can act as 
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NPPs and refrain from innovating and threaten others with unwanted li-
censing agreements. Therefore, large structural changes in the U.S. patent 
regime are needed to remedy this tension. 
III. RECENT PATENT-BASED CLIMATE RESPONSES 
 Although the U.S.’s future role in the fight against climate change 
is reshaping, it is important to note that there have been several attempts 
in the U.S. to curb the effects of climate change, including through its own 
patent system. The Paris Climate Agreement, which the U.S. helped nego-
tiate but ultimately left, calls for countries to utilize technology transfer as 
a way to mitigate the effects of climate change.94 This provision can rea-
sonably be construed as an expansion of intellectual property rights in pur-
suit of public necessity. 
 The U.S. is still a part of the Agreement on Trade-Relations As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), which the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) initiated.95 Several authorities have interpreted 
the TRIPS Agreement to loosen patent protections as a way to stimulate 
environmental innovation in the developing world.96 However, its provi-
sions are equally applicable to domestic markets and many authorities 
have interpreted certain provisions to justify changing patent regimes to 
accelerate green technology expansions.97 For example, Article 8(1) al-
lows members to adopt necessary measures to protect public health98 and 
Article 30 allows countries to offer limited exceptions to rights exclusion 
as long as these exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with the 
rightsholders’ interests and consider the perspectives of third parties.99 
This section will detail the policies that both the public and private sectors 
have developed or implemented, demonstrating that they have not 
achieved optimal results.    
A. Public Sector Responses 
A brief overview of recent solutions to combat climate change 
outside of U.S. patent law is needed to show what private and public in-
dustry has already considered. Some of the more prominent proposals 
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from recent history include cap and trade initiatives and carbon taxes.100 
During the Obama Administration, Congress and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) considered cap and trade programs as a way to place 
industry standards on GHG emissions. For example, in 2009, Congress 
proposed the American Clear Air and Security Act aimed at lowering the 
cap on GHGs on an incremental basis.101 However, these proposals have 
been met with hostility from the affected industries as they allegedly do 
not encourage innovation.102 Alternatively, carbon taxes impose a direct 
tax on businesses based on the tons of carbon emitted, encouraging indus-
try to innovate toward green technology.103 However, much like cap and 
trade programs, these taxes are met with equal hostility.104 
The most recent proposal to gain national attention was the Green 
New Deal.105 This resolution, sponsored by Congresswoman Alexandria 
Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Senator Ed Markey (D-MA), aims to achieve 
net-zero GHG emissions by transferring American labor into more sus-
tainable sectors of industry while also creating new jobs and investing in 
infrastructure.106 However, the Green New Deal was met with backlash 
over its perceived radical effects,107 and, while the Bill passed in the House 
of Representatives, the Senate refused to hold a vote on it.108  
While federal legislation aimed toward combating climate change 
is paramount to protecting the environment, the current state of American 
politics provides uncertainty as to whether any groundbreaking environ-
mental legislation pertaining to GHG standards will manifest from Con-
gress. Therefore, looking to the patent system is an important part of craft-
ing solutions.  
1. Specialized Environmental Intellectual Property Processing 
Some proposals have called for the U.S. to gear its patent system 
toward promoting environmental protection. One proposal creates a spe-
cific department for green patents that aims to fix certain shortcomings 
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within the USPTO.109 As demonstrated in KRS International Co. v. Tele-
flex, Inc., the non-obvious requirement is strict and may inhibit innova-
tion.110 Though the USPTO already covers patents for green technology, a 
specialized department could relax the non-obvious requirement for green 
patents, shorten the period of exclusivity, include a review from the EPA, 
and reconsider the requirement for novelty.111 The categories of patents 
within this sector may include increasing energy efficiency, replacing fos-
sil fuels, capturing CO2, and other solutions.112 However, because such 
solutions would only impose slight modifications to current patent law, 
they would only promote incremental changes at best.113 
Obtaining a patent is a lengthy process and the need to issue pa-
tents quickly is critical. In December 2009, the USPTO created a fast-
tracking system for green technology patents called the “Green Technol-
ogy Pilot Program.”114 With this program, an applicant was able to have 
their patent receive special examination if it pertained to an area of envi-
ronmental protection such as GHG reduction.115 Rather than loosening 
doctrinal requirements for the patent, this proposed program addresses the 
urgency to get green patents issued. However, at the end of 2011, the 
USPTO announced that the program would be eliminated over the next 
few months.116 Today, the USPTO’s website directs applicants to other 
fast-tracking programs, although not specifically geared toward green 
technology.117 While loosening patent requirements, shortening the length 
of exclusivity, and speeding up the application process are important steps, 
these adjustments do not alleviate the Green Patent Paradox; the threat of 
patent infringement from an NPP would remain and continue to hinder the 
progress needed to create a high volume of green technology for an envi-
ronmentally sustainable economy. 
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2. Compulsory Licensing 
While focuses on environmental intellectual property are viable in 
theory, such proposals would need compulsory licensing to advance their 
purpose. Paice distinguishes compulsory licensing from ongoing royal-
ties.118  Whereas ongoing royalties are awarded as equitable remedies in 
patent litigation from a specific defendant, compulsory licensing gives the 
general public congressional authority to use a patented invention.119 In 
other words, a compulsory license is a governmental grant to use, sell, 
produce, or import patented technology without the patent holder’s con-
sent.120 Goals around compulsory licensing include protecting public 
health interests and safeguarding the supply of patented products in the 
market, all while “preserving healthy competition between firms.”121 
Other countries have considered compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical 
products in the wake of malaria, HIV/AIDS, anthrax, cancer, and other 
diseases.122 Therefore, because climate change also threatens public 
health, expanding patented green technologies through compulsory licens-
ing is conceivable.  
One can interpret Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement to permit 
compulsory licensing because it declares that the “limited exception” from 
Article 30 “shall be predominantly for the supply of the domestic mar-
ket.”123 However, some laws in the U.S. have already created licensing 
schemes similar to compulsory licensing.124 For example, the Atomic En-
ergy Act provides that the government can license nuclear or atomic pa-
tents if the license advances public interest.125 Also, the Attorney General 
can certify to a district court under the Clean Air Act that specific statutory 
requirements are met, which may require a patent holder in that court’s 
jurisdiction to license their patent on reasonable terms.126  
Compulsory licensing of green patents is seen as solution to “en-
sur[e] easy access to, and wide dissemination of, [green technologies] 
throughout the word.”127 However, as previously suggested in this section, 
certain regulations governing what industries must do may be considered 
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unpopular from the private sector’s perspective. Furthermore, the over-
arching attitude toward compulsory licensing is that it dilutes the incen-
tives of inventors and prospective patent holders.128 Therefore, compul-
sory licensing is unlikely to become a reality in the U.S. 
B. Private Sector Responses 
 Although the public sector should continue to play a role in com-
bating climate change, the private sector plays an equally important role 
in such an endeavor by actively developing and inventing new green tech-
nology. The sustainable technology industry grapples with how to locate 
sustainable technologies while reducing costs and promoting sharing.129 
Even though the patent system, by default, preserves the right to exclude 
for the patentee, private sector entities have–as this section will detail–
engaged in collaborative and humanitarian initiatives to meet these goals 
while achieving the highest and best use for their inventions. 
1. Patent Pooling 
One of these business initiatives aimed at curing market deficien-
cies is patent pooling. Patent pooling occurs when a group of companies 
combine their complementary patents under a single license.130 These vol-
untary business transactions stem from a patent holder’s realizations that 
they are better off pooling their invention with others’ resources rather 
than solely reaping the benefits of their exclusion rights.131 Furthermore, 
if a patent holder needs to implement a change to their invention not cov-
ered by their issued right, they will benefit from seeking a joint agreement 
with another participant.132 In effect, pieces of green technologies come 
together, are carried out to their highest and best use, reach the market, and 
promote a sustainable economy. 
While patent pooling can promote market efficiency, it is not with-
out its setbacks. Overall, patent pooling does not consistently increase the 
volume of green technology in the market or reduce transactional costs for 
rightsholders.133 Even if several green patent holders pool their ideas, there 
is no guarantee that their compiled invention will enter the market at an 
optimal rate.134 In other words, the same concerns around the Green Patent 
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Paradox arise if that group sits on its collective rights and does not ade-
quately license. Also, while patent pooling is a cost-reducer, it may impli-
cate increased costs in areas like R&D during the coordination process.135 
Furthermore, patent pools may be susceptible to price-fixing and other 
anti-competitive practices, with prospective licensees bearing those 
costs.136 
2. Open Patents 
Perhaps the most successful private sector initiative to remedy the 
Green Patent Paradox is demonstrated through companies freeing up their 
exclusion rights by sharing their patents. An entity that engages in open-
sourcing of their patent rights permits other users to use and adapt their 
idea.137 Open-sourcing originated in software development, which thrives 
off of the liberal usage of source code.138 Its concept has since expanded 
to include environmental innovation and has permitted second comers to 
expand on patented green technology without the fear of patent infringe-
ment.139 
Open-sourcing takes several different forms. In 2008, Interna-
tional Business Machines (IBM), Nokia, Pitney Bowes, and Sony banned 
together and formed the Eco-Patent Commons (EPC).140 The EPC is a 
large-scale patent pool but without allocations of cost.141 The stated pur-
pose of the EPC is to “help the world community to reduce waste, pollu-
tion, global warming, and energy demands.”142 A company need only 
pledge one of its green patents to join the EPC, and, since its formation 
more companies have contributed, including Xerox and Ricoh.143 Relat-
edly, at the 2010 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Nike, 
Yahoo!, Best Buy, and other companies announced a collaborative online 
innovation platform called GreenXchange, where members can share their 
intellectual property rights and develop business models together.144 Un-
like the EPC, GreenXchange conditions the use of patent rights whereby 
improvements on the technology are licensed back to the original 
rightsholder.145 
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 Some companies have gone the extra mile by taking the initiative 
to open their own patents to the general public. For example, in 2014, 
Tesla Motors’s founder and chairman Elon Musk announced on behalf of 
his company that he will be releasing Tesla’s patents to anyone who wants 
to use them.146 As a legal effect, Tesla made an irrevocable pledge to not 
initiate lawsuits against anyone who uses its patented technology for elec-
tric car development, which covers its patents for battery charging sys-
tems, electric motors, thermal management, and other inventions.147 
 Although opening up green patent rights is a breathtakingly pro-
gressive response from the private sector, it seems to only come from com-
panies that have already achieved success in the market. It may be that 
most of these companies were incentivized to free up their patents to bol-
ster their reputation in the age of open innovation or to demonstrate their 
commitment to environmental sustainability.148 Conversely, startups and 
smaller companies are incentivized to secure patents to attract investors, 
demonstrate high core asset values, and build their patent portfolios.149 
Thus, not all companies can afford to donate their patents to others. To 
ensure that newly registered green patents get the widespread use they de-
serve, a fundamental system that balances the demand for secondary use 
with the interests of the rightsholder is needed.  
IV. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE IN PATENT LAW 
 While the public and private sectors have developed heroic initia-
tives to combat climate change, the judicial branch can and should play an 
important role. As part of this effort, patent law can look to copyright law, 
its constitutional counterpart,150 for guidance. Copyright law has a fair use 
defense against infringement that was originally developed from case 
law.151 Due to the historic development of copyright’s fair use doctrine 
under the common law, Title 17 of the U.S. Code now enumerates four 
factors for the courts to consider when determining whether a person is 
privileged as a secondary user to incorporate the contents of a copyrighted 
work into their own fair use: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) 
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the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.152  
The fair use doctrine in copyright law arose in part as an acknowledgment 
that the copyright system does not efficiently produce optimal results in 
the market for creativity. Accordingly, Congress acted to fix market defi-
ciencies and create socially desirable outcomes.153 Additionally, fair use 
was judicially established in trademark law as a defense against infringe-
ment, although its application is more limited than fair use of copyright.154 
Therefore, of the three main bodies of intellectual property, patent law is 
the only one without a fair use defense. The remainder of this section will 
compare copyright law to patent law and demonstrate that patent law is 
equally deserving of a fair use defense against infringement.  
A. Patents and Copyrights Compared 
 While it is evident that patent and copyright have separate do-
mains for intellectual property protection, both have strikingly similar or-
igins and features. Both patent and copyright law are rooted in the Progress 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.155 Since the Constitution’s ratification, 
both bodies of law have been developed through statutes as well as com-
mon law principles.156 Through these developments, copyright and patent 
law have established similar doctrines such as contributory infringement, 
licensee estoppel, and the first sale defense, otherwise known as exhaus-
tion.157 Most importantly, as patent and copyright promote and establish 
rules in innovation, each grapple with the question of how to protect the 
incentives of creators while allowing subsequent inventors and users to 
build off of the works they register.158 Given these identical policy bal-
ances, adjusting the boundaries of patent protection to encourage further 
innovations through secondary and justifiable use is a conceivable solution 
to curing market deficiencies.  
 While patent and copyright have similar roots and characteristics, 
some justifications do exist as to why patent law has not developed the fair 
use defense. The most compelling reason is that patent law has higher 
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threshold requirements than copyright law. The degree of originality re-
quired for a work of art in copyright is much more lenient than the stand-
ards for novelty and non-obviousness in patents.159 Also, unlike copy-
righted works, patents are much more foundational. In other words, 
whereas patent law covers ideas, copyright covers expressions of ideas; 
thus, patents evidently grant a much broader scope of protection.160 Addi-
tionally, the USPTO clearly defines the scope of protected use for the pa-
tent holder, while the rights for a copyrighted work are only established 
through litigation.161 Furthermore, patent law and copyright law have dif-
ferent incentive schemes,162 whereby an inventor strives for patent protec-
tion of their work to gain authority over how that work is used in the mar-
ketplace.163 Given these differences, it would make sense that patent law 
has not developed a fair use defense as copyright law has done. However, 
patent law does enumerate other types of affirmative defenses and permit-
ted uses.    
B. Experimental Use versus Fair Use 
 The closest judicially created affirmative defense in patent law 
that justifies secondary use is experimental use. In patent law, experi-
mental use occurs when a person or entity uses a patented invention that 
has a non-infringing and non-commercial purpose.164 However, the doc-
trine does not protect a user who “reverse engineers the patented invention, 
invents around it, and offers a new, non-infringing product for sale,” or 
employs any otherwise commercial motive.165 This doctrine originated in 
Whittemore v. Cutter, an 1813 federal court decision authored by Justice 
Joseph Story that entertained the defendant’s argument that the use of the 
plaintiff’s patented machine for manufacturing playing cards was only for 
experimentation.166 
 Experimental use is primarily and beneficially used in the context 
of universities.167 The academic community enjoys the privilege of using 
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patented technology for “amusement, idle curiosity, or philosophical in-
quiry.”168 However, any use beyond these purposes constitutes unlawful 
infringement. In Madey v. Duke University, the Supreme Court struck 
down a lower court’s decision extending the experimental use defense to 
Duke University’s use of two lab equipment patents because its use was 
aligned with the university’s business purpose and went beyond philo-
sophical industry—its status as a non-profit entity was immaterial.169 Be-
cause of its ruling, this case has been called “the death knell on fair use in 
patent law.”170  
 Given today’s jurisprudence regarding secondary use of patents, 
advancements of patented technology—absent specific licensing agree-
ments—can only take place within institutions such as universities who 
are still at risk of liability for infringement. Luckily, patentees are usually 
reluctant to sue researchers at universities and other experimental users for 
use of their inventions as it may give them a bad reputation.171 Regardless, 
experimental use is ill-equipped to remedy the monopolistic issues around 
patent law. Particularly in the context of green technology, the experi-
mental use defense is insufficient to justify secondary use of patented in-
ventions. Large-scale innovation and commercialization of sustainable 
technology are needed to effectively mitigate the effects of climate 
change.172 Thus, for the judicial branch to play an effective part in curing 
market deficiencies, an application of the fair use doctrine to patent law 
will be needed.  
C. The Need for Fair Use in Patent Law 
 Although a fair use defense does not exist in patent law, scholars 
and others in the legal field have embraced the idea of applying fair use 
against patent infringement.173 The fair use doctrine in patent law would 
provide beneficial results in the market while also preserving the inherent 
interests of inventors and rightsholders.174 Furthermore, allowing fair use 
would reduce economic inefficiencies and avoid anti-competitive out-
comes in the market.175 Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement remains an 
international authority that supports fair use’s extension into patent law as 
it provides for “limited exceptions to the [patent holder’s] exclusive 
right.”176 During negotiations, several European countries advocated for 
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enumerating privileged uses of intellectual property into the agreement, 
yet the vague final text of Article 30 became the final compromise.177 
Dean Emerita Maureen O’Rourke178 has pioneered a ground-
breaking proposal for patent fair use.179 Like the copyright test for fair use, 
she has suggested factors for a court to consider in  a patent infringement 
suit. Specifically, to determine whether a secondary user of a patented in-
vention is justified as a fair user, she argues that courts should first weigh 
the following factors: (i) the nature of the advance by the user’s infringe-
ment; (ii) the purpose of the infringing use; (iii) the nature and strength of 
the market failure that prevents a license from being concluded; (iv) the 
impact of the use on the patentee’s incentives; and (v) the nature of the 
patented work.180 Second, if the court determines that an infringer is a fair 
user, the court will use the same factors to determine whether royalties 
should still be awarded to the patent holder.181 This two-tiered analysis is 
designed to resemble the elements of copyright’s fair use doctrine while 
also accounting for the incentives and financial interests of the patent 
holder.182 Dean Emerita O’Rourke predominantly discusses applying fair 
use to software and application program interface (API),183 which has be-
come a subject of debate for copyright fair use.184 Nevertheless, she also 
suggests that the doctrine could be equally applicable to other areas of 
technology such as the biomedical field.185 
 Subsequent ideas around patent fair use have either expanded 
upon or critiqued Dean Emerita O’Rourke’s proposal. For instance, some 
argue that an industry-specific application of a fair use defense to patent 
infringement is a more optimal outcome for the patent regime in the U.S.186 
It is worth noting that not all patented technologies are created equally; for 
instance, “biotech[nology] patents are more frequently found non-obvious 
than those from most industries…”187 Applying fair use broadly to all in-
dustries may not be successful for all types of industries and could break 
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the incentive schemes of patent law.188 Hence, fair use in patent law may 
arguably only work well in industries with “network effect” such as API, 
which, by their design, foster natural innovation.189  
 Nevertheless, Dean Emerita O’Rourke’s proposal aims to remedy 
the flaws of the U.S. patent regime. Specifically, fair use would reduce the 
“institutional bias” from the USPTO and reduce the number of “submarine 
patents,” a name for patents that are not utilized in the market.190 Further-
more, although Congress has the authority to define the parameters of pa-
tent protection, the courts can exercise their discretion and provide equally 
beneficial judgment by allowing secondary use on a case-by-case basis.191 
In effect, the courts will establish precedent and set standards for the pri-
vate sector, which would include defining instances where ongoing royal-
ties are still available for the patent holder.192 Most importantly, experi-
menters and secondary users would remain at a lower risk of infringement 
suits and would be able to utilize technology that is not used to its full 
capacity.193 
 The policy balance around extending fair use to patent law is clear 
and reflects that of copyright: while there is a strong societal need to break 
the exclusive control over patented products, the incentives of the inventor 
should not be diminished.194 This notion holds especially true in the con-
text of green patents because disincentivizing entrepreneurs to further ad-
vance green technology is as harmful as a patent holder sitting on the pa-
tent rights for that technology. In either scenario, the market will not have 
an optimal supply of sustainable technology. Therefore, a specialized ap-
plication of the fair use doctrine can help promote the expansion of green 
technology while preserving the business interests of patent holders and 
inventors. 
V. A PROPOSAL FOR FAIR USE OF PATENTED GREEN TECHNOLOGY 
 To effectively adjust patent law to address the climate crisis, a 
comprehensive proposal is needed. In general, the U.S. patent regime 
should embrace the fair use doctrine as Dean Emerita O’Rourke makes 
clear in her argument; however, the standards for its application should be 
much narrower than its counterpart standard in copyright law. Although 
green technologies do not operate under a network effect like source code 
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or API, the fair use doctrine would provide positive results for both green 
technology industries, the environment, and public health.  
 Applying Dean Emerita O’Rourke’s general five-factor test would 
deliver mixed results in a hypothetical patent infringement lawsuit over 
green technology. The first factor, whether the advancement is a major 
step, would likely weigh in favor of the secondary user’s use of the tech-
nology if the nature of the advance is transformative, much like the doc-
trines in copyright.195 Analyzing factor two, the purpose of the infringing 
use, would likely involve additional fact-finding to determine if the sec-
ondary user exhibits a good-faith effort to bring the green technology to 
the market or whether the secondary user claim the invention as their own. 
Furthermore, the third factor, which assesses market failures, may reach 
differing results among federal courts depending on whether the threat of 
the Green Patent Paradox persuades a judge.  
In looking at the impact the secondary use might have on incen-
tives and social welfare, factor four would likely weigh in favor of the 
green patent holder in most cases given that the patent regime favors the 
incentives of inventors and rightsholders; however, a court may find a rea-
son to believe that a specific patent holder’s incentive would not be inhib-
ited by secondary use. Next, because the fifth factor directs the court to 
consider the nature of the patented invention, varying results would ensue 
among different sectors of green technology.196 Lastly, in looking at 
whether royalties should be awarded, a court might only answer in the af-
firmative if holding otherwise might have hypothetically dissuaded the pa-
tent holder to file for the patent on that particular invention.   
Overall, Dean Emerita O’Rourke’s test for fair use presents decent 
prospects for the advancement of green technology. However, while it 
may benefit secondary users on a case-by-case basis, it does not provide 
promising results for the environmental sustainability industry as a whole. 
Furthermore, this test could risk excluding green technology altogether if 
a judge finds a convincing reason to disallow secondary use. Therefore, a 
green technology-specific application of fair use would be beneficial for 
the inventors and patent holders, the secondary users, and the planet. The 
remainder of this article will outline a proposal for fair use of patented 
green technology and then address several anticipated concerns.  
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A. Green Patent Fair Use Proposal 
1. Step One: Codifying Fair Use into Patent Law 
Congress has the constitutional authority to create laws that ad-
vance the development of technology through patents.197 Therefore, the 
optimal step to promote the use of green patents is to pass a federal law 
that provides a defense to patent infringement for green technology. While 
fair use is not codified in any form within Title 35 of the U.S. Code, Con-
gress has enacted patent provisions tailored for specific purposes that in-
volve loosening patent protection for the rightsholder.198 For instance, the 
Patent Act permits infringement where secondary use is part of a process 
to obtain approval of a new drug from the Federal Drug Administration.199 
Additionally, the Act limits a patentee’s ability to recover damages when 
a patented invention is used in a medical or surgical procedure.200 These 
statutory exceptions to patent infringement reflect the notion that Ameri-
can society values technologies that provide a public health benefit, even 
if it is at the expense of a patent holder’s right to exclude.201  
To ensure that the policy motives around green technology in the 
American industries are captured, Congress should engage in extensive 
fact-finding through congressional hearings and research. A bill from ei-
ther chamber should incorporate the international consensus that climate 
change is a global threat to the planet that also has the potential to jeop-
ardize public health.202 It should also make clear that climate change is 
anthropogenic and has accelerated in part due to environmentally hazard-
ous industrialization.203 Furthermore, the bill should capture factual find-
ings that touch on the following: that technological innovation plays a vital 
role in mitigating the effects of climate change;204 that a mass expansion 
of environmentally sustainable technology is needed to substitute the en-
vironmentally hazardous technologies;205 and that altering the U.S. patent 
law is a necessary action to promote this expansion.206 These findings 
should also qualify that patent holders’ incentives are equally important to 
the development of an environmentally sustainable economy.207 The ele-
ments of fair use in the law should not only be specific enough to guide 
the courts in their analysis of whether the secondary user is privileged as 
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a fair user of a green patent but also general enough to provide a working 
template for courts to use in infringement suits.  
2. Step Two: Analyzing Fair Use 
Even if Congress does not implement a fair use doctrine for green 
patents–a probable scenario given its current state of dysfunction–the fed-
eral court system is also authorized to intervene on its own. Two justifica-
tions permit the courts to allow fair use in patent law: first, fair use in cop-
yright law was originally judicially created208 before Congress codified 
it,209 and, second, federal courts have already ruled on patent infringement 
cases with outcomes that favor continued use by second-comers as seen in 
eBay and Paice.210 Whether or not the primary authority comes from the 
legislature, courts should undergo the following analysis in its fair use de-
fense: 
(1) Does the patent at issue cover a field of green technology? The 
first part of the analysis requires courts to determine whether the patent at 
issue covers environmental sustainability or protection. To properly guide 
their analysis, the courts would benefit from having Congress enumerate 
a non-exhaustive list of industries that can utilize a fair use defense, such 
as alternative energies, fuel-efficiency, GHG and pollution reductions, and 
so on. Nevertheless, courts are equally capable of making their own deter-
mination.  
(2) If the patent covers green technology, and the second-comer 
infringes on its use, is that user privileged as a fair user? Under this prong, 
the court will assess several considerations regarding the patent regime, 
much like Dean Emerita O’Rourke’s aforementioned proposal. However, 
the factors for this green patent fair use proposal will be tailored to capture 
the considerations of green technology industries. Although Congress 
should enumerate these factors into the law, the court can further develop 
and define them: (1) the market potential; (2) the patentee’s developments; 
(3) the purpose and nature of the secondary use; and (4) the interests of the 
patentee and industry.  
First, the court should consider the potential market impact of the 
patented technology at issue. To adequately assess this factor, experts in 
technological fields can testify in federal infringement suits and make rea-
sonable valuations of the patented technology’s capabilities in the market. 
This judicial assessment can reveal the untapped potential that may justify 
secondary use.  
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Second, the court should evaluate the patentee’s developments of 
each patent. This part of the test will determine whether the patentee is 
sitting on the patent or whether they are capitalizing on its potential found 
in factor one. This step in the test aims to remedy the concerns around the 
Green Patent Paradox by determining whether the patent holder is making 
the best use of the patent. If the patentee has no intention of using their 
patent to fill the market demand, then this factor would weigh strongly in 
favor of its fair use. 
Third, the court should look at the purpose and nature of the sec-
ond-comer’s advance on the technology. This factor combines two of 
Dean Emerita O’Rourke’s factors211 and prompts the court to look at the 
secondary use itself. However, this part of the test is more tailored to the 
innovations in green technology. Ultimately, the crux of this factor is de-
termining whether the secondary user’s use of the technology is meant to 
provide positive results for the sustainability market. For example, using 
lucrative solar panel technology that achieves an environmentally benefi-
cial purpose can be deemed fairer than using an eco-friendly pet product 
that may be in a smaller potential market. Additionally, if the secondary 
user is mainly striving to achieve a particular sustainability standard for 
their innovative pursuit, rather than directly compete with the patent holder 
in the market, then this factor would weigh in favor of secondary use.  
Finally, the court should analyze whether permitting secondary 
use would drastically impact the interests of the patent holder or the green 
technology industry at large. Here, a court should consider the incentives, 
resources, and commercial interests of the patentee as well as the interests 
of the relevant green technology industries. If the patent holder has a le-
gitimate reason to hold onto their patent rights, this factor would weigh 
strongly in favor of excluding the second-comer from using the technology 
without a license. Otherwise, this factor should be equally weighed to-
gether with the other three factors.  
(3) If the secondary user is a fair user, does justice require com-
pensation for the patent holder? Because the second part of this proposal 
imposes a heightened standard against the patentee’s incentives, court-or-
dered royalties should remain an option much like Dean Emerita 
O’Rourke’s proposal.212 This part of the test recognizes that the fair use 
assessment is binary: secondary use of the green patent is either allowed 
or not allowed. Thus, awarding a modest, reasonable amount of royalties 
can offset any grievances that may arise if the patentee loses their exclu-
sive right over the green patent at issue.   
Because the four factors in the second prong of this proposal are 
more strictly applied against the patent holder, rather than imposing the 
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same four factors as Dean Emerita O’Rourke proposes, the court should 
instead determine on its own whether royalties should be awarded. How-
ever, depending on the capital and resources of the secondary user, these 
royalties should be limited so as not to chill the subsequent implementa-
tion of the green technology.    
B. Further Considerations 
This technology-specific proposal is designed to speed the process 
of implementing green technology in the U.S. while still recognizing that 
the patent scheme is inherently designed to promote innovation. Once  sec-
ondary users are permitted to use patented green technology, they can ac-
tively work toward bringing the U.S. into a sustainable economy without 
fear of infringement action. Ultimately, the issues raised by the Green Pa-
tent Paradox would be resolved by this proposal, which seeks to streamline 
and advance outside innovation while ensuring patent holders arer suffi-
ciently compensated. However, with any proposal, several considerations 
remain to be addressed. 
1. The Patentee’s Rights 
Although this proposal directly addresses concerns surrounding 
the climate crisis, it must be acknowledged that many scholars are skepti-
cal of both the expansion of patent rights beyond the patentee and the im-
pact it would have on the patent incentive scheme.213 Patentees in the field 
of green technology have a particular incentive to hold onto their rights, 
especially companies with larger carbon footprints.214 Moreover, fair use 
of patented green technologies, unlike certain transformative uses of cop-
yrighted works, would almost always be for commercial purposes.  
However, the overarching goal of this proposal is to change the 
dynamics within the green technology industry. As Dean Emerita 
O’Rourke points out, fair use would promote standard-setting whereby 
companies can set their own guidelines regarding the allocation of their 
intellectual property based on reasonable terms.215 Moreover, it would 
serve as a bargaining chip for licensing, which can reduce the royalty rate 
for second-comers.216 Hence, as this proposal promotes sharing within the 
private sector, companies can work together toward the common goal of 
combatting climate change. 
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Another consideration involves whether to allow fair use if the 
patentee specifically refuses to license their patent to the infringer. In cop-
yright law, a fair user of copyrighted work is still allowed to go forward 
with their derivative creation, regardless of whether the rightsholder de-
nied that user permission.217 In recognition of the existential threat posed 
by the climate crisis, patent law should follow suit and bypass this poten-
tial concern. As previously mentioned, a patentee’s reasoning behind the 
refusal to license can be considered in the assessment of fair use or whether 
ongoing royalties should be awarded.  
2. Implementation 
Additionally, even with fair use in patent law, the ITC’s independ-
ence from the federal judiciary remains a concern for expanding green 
technology to the market. Because of its independence, it is unknown 
whether it would incorporate fair use into its investigations, and thus, a 
plaintiff who loses in court may still use this alternate forum to preclude 
secondary use.218 To prevent a patent holder from utilizing other avenues 
to curb secondary use, this proposal will include guidelines on congres-
sional action that would help establish boundaries on what the ITC can 
investigate regarding green technology. While it conducts its investiga-
tions, the ITC should recognize the global threat of climate change.  
Furthermore, because patents and trade secrets can protect the 
same subject matter,219 a prospective inventor could seek trade secret pro-
tection for their intellectual property to avoid the prospect of fair use by 
others.220 Thus, rather than apply for a patent, an inventor or company that 
invents a novel green technology could employ security measures to keep 
their idea secret and, in effect, the schematics of the invention would never 
reach public view and society would not benefit. However, trade secrets 
have their downsides as they can be difficult to enforce and risk losing 
their protections if others utilize the same idea.221 Additionally, from an 
investor’s perspective, the value of a patent is more tangible than the value 
of a trade secret.222 This realization is an important distinction given that 
 
217 See Campbell v. Acuff Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994) (holding that 2 Live Crew’s parody of 
“Oh, Pretty Woman” was fair use in spite of the fact that Acuff-Rose’s agent had previously refused 
to license the song). 
218 About the USITC, supra note 71. 
219 PAUL A. SWEGLE, STARTUP LAW AND FUNDRAISING: FOR ENTREPRENEURS AND STARTUP 
ADVISORS 217 (Business Law Group Seminar, LLC eds., 1st ed. 2020).  
220 See Boynton, supra note 130, at 674-76. 
221 World Intell. Prop. Org., World Intellectual Property Organization – Innovation for a Green Fu-
ture: How Intellectual Property Rights Can Support the Transition to a Sustainable, Low Carbon 
Economy, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/ip-outreach/en/ipday/2020/green_future.html 
[https://perma.cc/4UEE-YDH5]. 
222 See Id. 
244 Seattle J. Tech., Envtl. & Innovation Law [Vol. 11:1 
 
green technology is a capital-intensive industry.223 Moreover, inventors in 
green technology industries can benefit from having their works made 
public because in the long run because public access “can support the dif-
fusion and adaptation of existing green technologies that are in the public 
domain.”224  
Lastly, concerns around timing need to be addressed. If Congress 
does not codify this proposal and leaves any developments to the courts, 
expansions of green technology will not accelerate at a necessary rate. In-
stead, a judicially created fair use doctrine for patent law may merely pro-
vide incremental change to green patents at best as it would only develop 
case-by-case through individual lawsuits.225 Regardless of whether federal 
institutions will initiate this proposal, industries at large should still strive 
to advance green technology at a rapid pace. Although inventors and en-
trepreneurs risk becoming defendants to patent infringement suits, eBay 
remains a shield for their technologies’ continued development.226 Even-
tually, the climate crisis’s growing threat will pressure the U.S. to tolerate 
transfers of patented green technology so that such technologies receive 
their highest and best use at the lowest cost to the patent holders and other 
users. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The world faces an imminent threat from climate change that re-
quires drastic structural attention. The U.S. has always led the world in 
promoting and preserving global security, but political gridlock within the 
nation could stall the massive changes to steer the world in the right direc-
tion. Fortunately, the private sector has an equally important role and duty 
in the pursuit to reform various industries. However, while industry and 
entrepreneurship can further develop necessary green technology, a com-
prehensive transformation in the U.S. patent regime must take place in or-
der to fix the inherent issues around secondary innovations. The Green 
Patent Paradox demonstrates that the patent system impedes innovation by 
allowing rights’ holders to sit on their patent rights further slowing the 
transition to an environmentally sustainable economy. Although eBay is a 
victory in that it helps encourage continued use of other patent holder’s 
green patents, the ITC functions as a loophole for patent holders who want 
to halt secondary users or pressure them to take unwanted licensing agree-
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The public and private sectors have both revealed possible solu-
tions in the wake of the climate crisis. While the public sector can fix the 
patent regime through various means, these solutions either have substan-
tial barriers to becoming reality or pose implementation issues that inhibit 
inventor incentives. Even with goodwill gestures from large companies, 
not all businesses are positioned to donate their intellectual property. The 
doctrine of fair use does not exist in patent law under conceivable ration-
ales even though many viable justifications support its application. How-
ever, the lurking effects of the climate crisis demonstrate the societal need 
to implement a system that tolerates secondary uses of patented green tech-
nologies.   
Optimally with the help of Congress, the judicial branch should 
allow fair use as an affirmative defense against patent infringement. Such 
a doctrine would allow secondary use of valuable green patented technol-
ogies that may not otherwise reach their full potential while still protecting 
the rightsholders’ financial and commercial interests. Although patent fair 
use may not be implemented at the necessary rate, the valiant efforts to 
innovate from companies within the green technology industry is a vital 
starting place to carry the U.S. through the twenty-first century. 
 
